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1. Introduction and research questions 
Climate change is one of the biggest challenges that the world is facing today, and it is largely 
due to the use of fossil fuels such as coal. It is estimated that reliance on coal will continue for 
quite some time, but meanwhile we have an urgent need to curb greenhouse gas emissions. 
No single technology can solve the problem of climate change. Instead, a combination of 
different measures is needed, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) may be a part of it. (IPCC, 
2005) 
Some argue that CCS is inevitable. If that were true, considering the hurry there is to mitigate 
climate change, it is of utmost importance to understand the risks of the technology and also 
what is holding it back, to avoid unforeseen setbacks or other problems. It is also important to 
carefully assess whether the risks are worthwhile, or whether other solutions are more 
feasible.  
CCS is a new technology that involves many uncertainties. It’s possible impacts are not only 
those that can affect human health and the environment, but also ones that can have complex 
consequences for the larger socio-cultural context. On one hand, CCS could be a savior in the 
battle against climate change; on the other it could produce a lock-in in fossil fuels. Analyzing 
the risks related to it is challenging, since they cannot be measured by the traditional agent-
consequence analysis (Renn, 2011). Meanwhile, decisions need to be made, even in the 
presence of uncertainties. This is why broad analysis that aims at seeing the whole picture is 
necessary.  
A fair amount of research on carbon capture and storage has been done1. Most of the 
literature deals with technical issues or economics  (i.e. Abadie, Metz, Conling). There is also a 
lot of assessment on the potential of CCS (i.e. Herzog, Warner). Risk assessments can be found 
on financial issues (i.e. Giovanni, Heydari), public acceptance (i.e. van Alphen, Logan J.), 
regulations (i.e. Blyth, Wilson) and some on more general scale (i.e. Mahasenan, Hovorka). 
Broad socio-political analysis is rather scarce.  
CCS has been studied also in the context of the media. The closest one to this thesis was done 
in 2006 by the Tyndall centre Climate change research group of the University of Manchester. 
The research focused on the emergence of CCS through its portrayal in the print media in the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia (Mander and Gough, 
2006). In 2011, there was another interesting CCS and media related study by Buhr and 
Hansson (2011). Their aim was to analyze the framings of Statoil and Vattenfall, which are the 
major CCS developers, in the Norwegian and Swedish media.  
What is different in this research is the use of narrative analysis combined to risk perception 
theories and media analysis. Instead of using only statistical methods to analyze the data, this 
research has a strongly qualitative nature. It aims to take a multi-perspective, holistic approach 
                                                             
1 Search performed in Nelli database of the University of Helsinki with the keywords “carbon capture 
and sequestration” and “risks of carbon capture and sequestration”. 
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to media portrayal of risks related to CCS technology and the possible implications it could 
have for public perception and consequently for policy practices. 
This thesis is a part of a wider research project on the risk governance of carbon dioxide 
capture and storage (RICCS) which is done in cooperation between Helsinki University and 
Aalto University.  In the RICCS project the systemic risks related to CCS are assessed based on 
interviews of stakeholders in different sectors of society from countries with past or ongoing 
CCS projects in different stages. The present study will give additional insights to CCS risk 
analysis by diving into the stories that the media tells about the risks. The media is relevant 
because on one hand, the media plays a significant role in public perception of risks 
(Kaspersson et al., 2000), on the other hand - it portrays what is going on in society. 
I will analyze media coverage on CCS in the most wide spread newspapers of Norway and 
Finland. These countries were chosen because they represent extreme examples of success 
and failure of the technology. The aim is to identify what kind of risk framings are portrayed by 
the media; how strong is the presence of uncertainties and what kind of uncertainties are 
brought up. The media is seen as a mirror of public perception, but also one of the players 
influencing it.  
I will look into the implications of my findings for future policy practices. The possible effects 
that the analyzed articles could have on public perception of risks will be discussed. I do not 
aim for a comparative study of the two countries. However, the most interesting differences 
between media coverage in Norway and Finland will be brought up. 
The research questions are: 
1) How do Norwegian and Finnish newspapers portray the degree and type of uncertainty 
related to CCS technology? 
2) According to the findings, what kind of policy practices could reduce the risks of CCS? 
3) What are the implications of the media portrayal for public perception and acceptability 
of CCS? 
 
2. Background 
Carbon dioxide is not directly harmful or hazardous. On the contrary, it is a natural substance, 
present in plants and animals forming an important part of the function of ecosystems. The 
carbon pools on Earth can be separated into mobile and stable pools. Stable pools are 
carbonate rocks or underground coal seams. The mobile pools consist of the atmosphere, the 
biosphere and the ocean. The exchange between mobile carbon pools is constant and rapid, 
but they are mostly decoupled from stable pools. In the use of fossil fuels, fossil carbon from 
stable carbon pools is released into mobile pools - mostly the atmosphere. This accumulation 
leads to climate change, which is why anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions are a problem. 
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Since the industrial revolution, the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere has grown by 
over a third, from 280 parts per million by volume (ppm) to 385 ppm. The production and use 
of fossil fuels are the most important contributors to the increase. Still today, as much as 81% 
of the world's commercial energy supply is provided by fossil fuels. It is argued that the world 
cannot afford to lose these cheap, stable and readily available energy resources, even when 
considering all their consequences in terms of environmental and other damage. In the case of 
coal, the problem is not only the greenhouse gases it produces. Coal mining causes direct 
environmental damage, accidents where workers get killed and the burning of coal causes air 
pollution harmful to human health.  
2.1. CCS and climate change 
The international community is struggling to find effective ways to mitigate climate change. An 
often mentioned target for stabilizing atmospheric CO2 is 450 ppm (Harrison and Hester, 2010), 
though according to some researchers and NGOs (e.g. James Hansen and 350.org) the ”safe” 
limit would be as low as 350 ppm. There are different options to pursuing these targets. 
Energy efficiency should play a key role in the solution, but changing the current energy 
production scheme is also essential. The question is how to do this? 
When it comes to cleaner production of energy, one option is to move towards renewable 
energy resources, which would not produce such large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions 
as fossil fuels do. The problem is that the current energy demand is so vast, that it is difficult to 
find sustainable options to fulfill it. Furthermore, changing the current infrastructure that is 
based on fossil fuels would be quite an extensive operation.  
One option for mitigating climate change is to prevent the mobilization of CO2 related to fossil 
fuel production and use. This is what carbon capture and storage aims at. (Harrison an Hester, 
2010) CCS is said to only be a temporary solution that would be used for around a hundred 
years, while waiting for the renewable energy industry to move forward. According to IPCC, in 
the trajectory aimed at keeping global warming at 2 degrees Celsius, CCS will play an important 
part (IPCC, 2005). It has been estimated that it could cover for even a third of the cuts in 
emissions during this century (Teir et al., 2009). Furthermore, according to most scenarios for 
stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations between 450 and 750ppmv CO2 
and in a least-cost portfolio of mitigation options, the economic potential of CCS would 
amount to 220–2,200 GtCO2 (60–600 GtC) cumulatively, which would mean that CCS 
contributes 15–55% to the cumulative mitigation effort worldwide until 2100, averaged over a 
range of baseline scenarios (IPCC, 2005).  
Estimates on economic potential involve significant uncertainties since actual implementation 
of CCS is likely to be lower than the economic potential due to factors such as environmental 
impacts, risks of leakage and the lack of a clear legal framework or public acceptance (IPCC, 
2005). If the infrastructure for CCS is put into place there is a risk of a lock-in to coal as an 
energy resource. Initiating CCS requires significant investments and construction work. If all 
this is done, it is a good question whether we could just easily move away from it after a short 
period of time. 
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2.2. CCS technology 
The aim in carbon capture technology is to get as clean a carbon stream as possible, so that it 
can be transported and stored.  The amount of CO2 in flue gas is only 3-15%, so it is cost-
effective to separate it from the rest of the substances. Otherwise the amount of gas to be 
stored would be enormous. Currently it is being done in large industries such as in the handling 
of natural gas and the manufacturing of ammonia and carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is being 
used in greenhouses, treatment of pulp, industrial pH regulation, the soft drink industry, as 
protective gas and as a refrigerant. The potential demand of CO2 for commercial use is far 
lower than the amount of the produced CO2 emissions (e.g. in Finland only 1% compared to 
annual emissions). Therefore most of it is released into the atmosphere. Different capturing 
technologies are being developed, though so far they have only been used for demonstration 
purposes and in small scale. The biggest challenge is in making them cost efficient. (Teir et. al, 
2009) Next I will go through some of the optional technologies in more detail. 
There are several different technologies for capturing CO2. In post-combustion capture, the 
CO2 is removed from flue gas produced in the combustion of coal, natural gas or biomass. In 
this process chemical solvents are being used to absorb the CO2 and later release a clean 
stream of it, which can then be pressurized and stored. The advantage of this technology is 
that it is suitable for most currently existing fossil fuel power plants. The down side is that the 
production of suitable solvents requires a lot of heat, which compromises the overall efficiency 
of the power plant. Furthermore, though the technology has already been in commercial use, 
applying it in the scale of electricity production requires massive up-scaling in size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The technological varieties for capturing CO2 (IPCC, 2005). 
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Pre-combustion capture of CO2 can be used in natural gas power stations and during the 
gasification of solid or liquid fuels. In the process of gasification, a solid fuel is turned into a 
fuel gas mixture, which is cleaned of all the harmful components and can then be used in 
integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) power plants. After this, there are two options 
for the separation of CO2: using the water-gas shift reaction or a solvent based on physical 
absorption or mixed absorption. The separated CO2 is dried and compressed for transport and 
storage.  
The general process of pre-combustion capture is more expensive and complex then the post-
combustion capture, but the actual separation of CO2 is cheaper when its content is greater 
and the gas is high pressured. The technology is used in large scale industrial production of 
hydrogen. Since very few existing power stations have the settings for gasification, it could 
mostly be used for new stations. The obstacles are mostly the same as for gasification 
techniques (IGCC) in general: low usability, high technical demands and high costs.  
In oxyfuel combustion, the fuel is burnt in nearly pure oxygen and a recycled fuel gas mixture. 
This way, the CO2 content of fuel gas becomes extremely high, making it much easier and 
cheaper to separate. In order to use this technology, the power plant needs to be equipped 
with an oxygen production unit and a CO2 treatment unit, which lowers the efficiency of the 
power plant by approximately 7-12% compared to a conventional one. Options for enhancing 
the efficiency of oxyfuel power plants, and also different ways of combining the processes are 
being studied. It is currently in demonstration phase, but seems to be a competitive option for 
CCS. (Teir et al., 2009) 
After capturing carbon dioxide, it needs to be transported to be stored (unless the storage site 
happens to be at the same location as the source of captured CO2). For large scale operations 
there are two options for doing this. Transporting CO2 through a pipeline is the most common 
method. It is already used for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) purposes for example in the USA. 
Building pipelines requires long permit processes. Pipelines are a very effective way to 
transport CO2. The usage costs are mostly due to the energy consumption of the pressurizing 
stations and maintenance. The problem is arranging financing for such large investments that 
involve many uncertainties.  
The other option is transporting liquid CO2 by ships. For now, it has not been done in such a 
large scale as would be necessary for CCS purposes, meaning cargos of more than 10 000 tons. 
However, it has been done for chemistry and food industries, in cargos below 2 000 tons. Ship 
transport is flexible and the fastest way for executing CCS logistics, but the capacity of suitable 
commercial carriers is limited. In addition to the carriers, infrastructure like temporary storage 
facilities and equipment for loading and unloading the CO2 is required. It is possible to unload 
the carrier directly at an off-shore storage site. In this case temporary on-shore storage would 
not be necessary. (Teir at. al, 2009) 
The vast amount of CO2 to be stored sets quite high demands for storage sites. The only fully 
demonstrated option is storage in geological formations, such as exhausted oil- and gas fields 
and saline formations. The CO2 is injected into the underground formation in such pressurized 
form that it behaves like vapor spreading into each crack. Still its density is that of liquid. The 
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injection is usually done in more than 800 meters deep, so that the pressure of the rock above 
would be equal to that of the injected CO2. Various physical and geochemical factors keep it 
from coming back to the surface. The most essential one of these is the impenetrable layer of 
rock and clay on top of the storage site. (Teir et al.,2009) 
The structure of the formation is also important. Closed formations are more secure than open 
ones (Figure2.). Unfortunately they are also scarcer. After the injection of CO2, water that was 
previously replaced by the CO2 starts moving back, trapping the CO2 in its place. Most of the 
CO2 will dissolve into the water during centuries of time and it might react with the 
surrounding rocks forming minerals, but this could take up to thousands of years. The 
estimates on the capacity of geological storage sites vary greatly. According to IPCC (2005) the 
theoretical storage potential could be at least 2 000 Gt. The saline formations have not yet 
been included in the calculations. 
Figure 2. Examples of open and closed formations (Teir et. al, 2009). 
 
Another option for storage is using CO2for enhanced oil recovery (EOR), in which case the CO2 
binds to the oil (or gas) field. EOR has already been widely used in Canada and the US. 
However, only in one demonstration site has it been captured CO2 (in others it has been of 
natural sources). In addition, the oil- and gas fields' capacity is not extensive enough to result 
in significant emissions reductions by using CCS. Injecting CO2 into underground coal seams is 
another storage option. The CO2 binds to the coal seam and methane is released. The methane 
can be captured. The method has been tested by some pilot projects, but swelling of the coal 
seam due to the CO2 has caused problems. Therefore the technology is still under 
development (Teir et al.,2009).  
Carbon dioxide can also be bound to silicate minerals to form carbonate minerals which are 
stable and harmless to the environment. Although the process of extracting the silicates would 
involve mining and would therefore have significant environmental impacts to be taken into 
account. The reaction of carbonate mineralization is slow and the process is very energy 
intensive.  
There has been speculation of the possibility of storing CO2 in oceans, but the uncertainties of 
the environmental impacts are too significant. Consequently, there is now legislation in place 
in the EU, which prohibits the direct storage of CO2 in the ocean. (Teir et. al, 2009) 
IPCC (2005) has identified four phases of maturity of CCS technologies: 
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?? Research phase. The basic science is understood, but the technology is still under testing and 
design at a laboratory or in small scale. It has not been tested in a demonstration plant. 
? ocean storage, mineral carbonisation 
?? Demonstration phase. The technology has been built and operated at pilot plant scale. For full 
scale, further development is required. 
? oxyfuel combustion, enhanced coal bed methane 
?? Economically feasible under certain conditions. The technology is well understood and used in 
certain commercial applications. There are fewer than 5 existing replications of the technology. 
In these replications more than 0.1 Mt CO2/yr is being processed. 
? post-combustion, pre-combustion, tanker transport, gas and oil fields, saline aquifers 
?? Mature market. The technology is in operation in commercial scale worldwide with multiple 
replications. 
? industrial separation, pipeline transport, enhanced oil recovery, industrial utilization 
Current research is mostly focused on CCS applications for power plants and further 
development of storage technologies. Power plant technologies require big investments and a 
vast amount of energy. To achieve the general aim of 80-90% capture rate (compared to a 
non-CCS plant), a power plant needs 10-40% more fuel, which raises the price of electricity 
production by 35-85%. Depending on the used technology and the type of power plant, the 
estimated increase of investment costs would be 40-80%. The costs are usually estimated 
according to the amount of avoided CO2 emissions, instead of captured emissions, because as 
more fuel is used, more CO2 will be produced. Since CCS has not been applied in large scale 
yet, there are many uncertainties in the cost estimations, for example future variables such as 
technology advances and changes in fuel price. (Teir et. al, 2009) 
2.3. CCS and risks 
It is challenging to classify the risks related to CCS, since many of them are interconnected and 
overlap in different sectors of society and fields of research. Even so, I have first broadly 
divided the risks into technical, financial, political and social (public acceptability). Later, in my 
theoretical framework, I will show how the inter-linkages between CCS uncertainties have 
been identified by Markusson et. al (2012). This will give a better idea of the complexity and 
overlapping of the uncertainties.  
2.3.1. Technology 
Leakage from a geological storage site is one of the most discussed risks related to CCS 
technology. The effects of leakage can be divided into two dimensions: the local dimension 
meaning environmental, health and safety risks and the global meaning the risk of carbon 
dioxide re-entering the atmosphere undermining climate change goals (Markusson et. al, 
2012).  
Carbon dioxide is a trace gas whose content in the ambient air is less than 0,04%. Its handling 
does not impose risks such as that of flammable or toxic substances. However, in high 
16 
 
concentrations it poses serious threats to health by interfering with cellular metabolism. 
Elevated partial pressures of CO2 in the blood can cause carbon dioxide narcosis with delirium, 
somnolence and coma. Concentrations higher than 10% can lead to death by suffocation. 
Because CO2mixes very easily with air, this could only happen in the immediacy of the leak or if 
it happened in a natural depression (since CO2is heavier than air). (Fogarty and McCally, 2010) 
Such situations have taken place. The most well-known example happened in Cameroon in 
1989, where suddenly a large cloud of CO2 burst from the crater lake Lake Nyos. 1,700 people 
and 3,500 livestock were suffocated.  
If the stored carbon dioxide would leak to underground aquifers, it would acidify the water. 
Consequently heavy metals and trace elements would dissolve easier in the water, possibly 
leading to water pollution. Also, too high injection pressure could result in cracks in the 
geological formation, which could lead to the present saline water getting in contact with 
ground water.  
It is not well known how stable the storage has to be, so that CCS would have the desired 
effect in mitigating climate change, but the current consensus estimate is that nearly all of the 
stored CO2 would need to be kept in storage for thousands of years. To avoid risks of leakage, 
evaluation of storage places is of great importance. Adequate mechanisms for monitoring 
storage sites and predicting possible leakages are also essential, and currently under 
development. Oil and gas technologies can be applied for monitoring in the injection phase of 
CO2 and also for sealing the storage site. However, some additional measures are needed when 
storing CO2. One is a backup plan for moving the CO2 to another storage site if needed. Another 
is monitoring of the site after it has been sealed. (Teir et. al, 2009) 
Quantitative risk analysis of carbon storage is challenging. Evaluating and picking the storage 
site is an extensive process, which requires a lot of geological research, ground water 
measures (of flowing routes and speed) and modeling based on the characterization of the site 
(Teir et. al, 2009). Probabilities and risks are not well known among developers, regulators and 
researchers and they lack experience when it comes to geological storage. The variety and 
complexity of the technologies brings on the challenge of integrating experts from different 
fields and also integrating the coordination of both component and system levels (Markusson 
et. al, 2012). 
The variety of pathways of is also a significant source of uncertainty when it comes to CCS 
technologies. There are many possible combinations regarding for example the type of 
capture, modes of CO2 transport, and types of storage facility. The competition between 
different technologies is likely to be reduced as deployment becomes wider. Which 
technologies will become the optimal ones and when, is still unsure.  
In order for CCS to be widely deployed, key CCS technologies need to be scaled up. To achieve 
this, the necessary knowledge, skills, industries and institutions have to be available. There is 
little knowledge on how much competition there will be among different technologies and 
whether the development and scale of one option will be dependent on those of another. So 
the question remains, will scaling-up be possible and fast enough and how can it be assessed? 
(Markusson et. al, 2012) 
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2.3.2. Finance 
As mentioned before, CCS systems require big investments (see 2.2.). Currently, applying CCS 
in power plants is not economically feasible, because the price of emissions allowances is still 
far lower than the costs of undertaking CCS. A technology is economically viable if it has a 
positive cost-benefit ratio. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has estimated that twenty 
full-scale demonstration plants (which is the G8 countries’ goal) would require funding of 20-
40 billion Euros. According to the European Platform for Zero Emissions Fossil Fuel Power 
Plants 10-12 large demonstration projects would be needed in the EU in order to achieve 
commercial CCS for 2020. This would require funding of 7-12 billion Euros. (European 
Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants, 2008) 
Even if a technology is economically viable, that does not necessarily mean that it is financially 
viable because it may have associated risks which make it less attractive than investing in 
alternatives (Markusson et. al, 2012). In a presentation of the CCS Alliance2, the main 
commercial risks of CCS are described as follows. Capital costs are very high and seen as the 
key barrier. Carbon emission legislation and regulatory rules on CCS are not defined well 
enough. Also, regulations are not yet clear enough to resolve CCS cost and liability issues. 
Incentives (tax credits, loans, allowances) are not in place to offset higher CCS costs. 
Engineering firms cannot economically offer enough warranty to cover risks, so few investors 
are willing to finance. CCS liability is not clear enough to close financing. Lower prices of other 
energy resources, such as natural gas can pose competitive problems (IEA, 2009). Also, the 
variety of pathways of CCS technologies (see 2.3.1.), makes investing a challenge, since early 
choices could get outdated quickly, stranding actors with uncompetitive assets or locking them 
into inferior CCS technologies (Markusson et.al, 2012).  
300 emissions allowances have been reserved by the EU to support twelve either CCS or 
renewable energy resources demonstration power plants by 2015. The USA, Australia, Canada 
and Norway have established national financing schemes to support the development of CCS. 
Canada has set aside a fund of 2 billion dollars and the US is already supporting CCS 
demonstration projects with over a billion US dollars (Teir et.al,2009).  
2.3.3. Legal framework and regulation 
   The legal framework is closely tied to the financing of CCS projects. Therefore in order for 
CCS to be successful, the relevant legal framework needs to be in place. The most relevant 
legislations are those dealing with emissions trade and liability issues.  
The European Union emissions trading scheme started in 2005. The directive on emissions 
trade obligates each member state to give out emissions allowances to the industries that 
form a part of the scheme. If they do not use all of their allowances, they can sell them. If they 
need more allowances, they must buy them. The EU emissions trade is the largest emissions 
trading system worldwide, covering around 45% of carbon dioxide emissions in the EU.  
                                                             
2  The presentation was for the context of the USA, but more or less the same obstacles apply 
worldwide. 
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In order to reduce emissions, the emissions allowances are cut year by year to finally achieve a 
21% reduction from 2005 to 2020. In 2013, the third period of emissions trading in the EU will 
begin. The revised directive includes some parts on CCS. It is stated that the allowances of 
captured emissions do not need to be given away. However, free allowances will not be given 
out for CCS. It is also mentioned, that the emissions allowances auction money could be used 
to finance CCS projects. (Teir et. al, 2009) 
The EU directive on geological storage (2009/31/EC) applies to storage in the territory of 
Member States, in their exclusive economic zones and on their continental shelves, in 
geological formations at onshore and offshore sites. Storage in territories outside the 
territorial scope of the Directive and the storage of CO2in water columns are not permitted. 
The Directive only applies to storage of above 100 000 tons. It is stated that possible 
CO2leakages are to be compensated, which means that the received emissions allowances for 
CCS are to be returned in the case of leakage.  
The Directive aims at guaranteeing safe storage and sufficient monitoring of the site. National 
authorities are responsible for requirements on the exploration of storage sites and permission 
processes involved. Various responsibilities of the operator are mentioned, such as analysis of 
the composition of the CO2to be stored, surveillance of the behavior of injected CO2 and 
monitoring possible leakages and the risks they pose to the environment, humans or climate.  
The operator must prove to be capable of meeting the costs resulting from any problematic 
situations before beginning injection. After the closing of the site, the operator remains 
responsible for the monitoring and maintenance of the site. Through time and once 
adequately proven that the CO2 will remain securely stored, the responsibility for the storage 
site can be transferred to officials. (Teir et. al, 2009) 
Another possibly decisive legal framework related to the success of CCS is its inclusion in the 
new climate agreement and most importantly in the clean development mechanism (CDM). 
This would mean that industrial countries could get emissions credits by funding CCS projects 
in developing countries. There has been a lot of debate on whether this is an efficient way of 
taking CCS forward. There was a step forward with this in COP17 in Durban, where CCS was in 
fact included in CDM (UNFCC, 2011). CDM has been criticized for allowing industrial countries 
to keep using polluting technologies, while giving out funding to developing countries, while 
many projects have not lived up to the aimed emissions reductions. As a result no emissions 
are cut, on the contrary, in some cases they have even grown. 
In Finland, a new CCS law was very recently (April 2012) put in place, in which CO2 storage in 
geological formations and in the ocean is prohibited. This is due to the fact, that there are no 
suitable geological formations in Finland. It is said in the act, that the situation can be re-
assessed if the technology develops in such a way that it becomes relevant. The law does not 
include projects that work with amounts of less than 100 000 tons when it is a matter of 
research, development and testing (HE 36/2012).  
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Policy instruments which could help CCS develop as well as politics like the processes of getting 
acceptance, legitimacy and continued support for CCS are important. Some crucial regulatory 
issues such as questions of liability and safety rules are still a bit uncertain. These are 
important issues for the future development of CCS, which partially depends on explicit 
political and policy choices (Markusson et. al, 2012).  
2.3.4. Public acceptability 
Public opinion on CCS can significantly affect the success of CCS projects and consequently the 
development of the technology and for example the acceptability of CCS as a means to 
mitigate climate change. There are many example cases of public resistance towards new 
technologies leading to delays or even cancellations of projects (Brunstig et al., 2010).   
In Germany there has been considerable opposition to CCS implementation. The Greens (die 
Grünen) and the new leftist party (die Linken) are against the implementation of CCS 
technology. Various large NGOS also oppose the technology and particularly certain storage 
sites. The anti CCS movement has been especially active in the state of Brandenburg where 
they have organized demonstrations, spreading of information and political activism. 
Vattenfall has put effort into enhancing public acceptability of CCS by organizing visits to the 
power plants and proposed storage sites, and by establishing a public relations officer in 
Beeskow. Still the development of CCS has been very slow. (Teir et al., 2009) 
There are also opposite examples of public opinion towards CCS. One is that of the Shwarze 
Pumpe area, where Vattenfall has built its first CCS pilot plant, there has not been much public 
resistance, maybe due to the fact that the site is already in heavy industrial use and the power 
plant is already in place. In Norway, social acceptability of CCS is generally more positive than 
in other regions. Even some local NGOs have been indecisive of their stand towards CCS. For 
example Snøhvit gas field, which is already being used as a storage site, is proudly presented in 
Hammerfest’s tourist brochures. So, it seems they are quite satisfied with having the site in the 
area. Statoil did have a massive media campaign connected to the facility, which could have 
made the response more positive. However, even in Norway some NGOs still oppose and 
criticize the site for its location in the valuable pristine Arctic. (Teir et al., 2009) 
In Barendrecht, Holland an onshore storage demonstration plant was planned by Shell. Debate 
about the project began immediately in the beginning of the project in 2008 and spread to 
opposition of first the municipal government and finally also the provincial government. By the 
end of 2009, the estimated project delay was at least two years. Finally, in November 2010 the 
new government decided to cancel the project. The Barendrecht project has been criticized for 
failing in information spreading and public participation practices. (Brunstig et al., 2010, Terwel 
et al., 2011) 
According to a Eurobarometer survey on public awareness and acceptance of CCS, people have 
very little knowledge of carbon capture and storage. An average of only 10% had heard of CCS 
and knew what it was. In areas where there have been projects, the rate was higher. Most 
respondents agreed that CO2 has a high impact on climate change, but felt the need for better 
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information on different options for reducing emissions. (Eurostat, 2011) People tend to be 
afraid of the unknown, so lack of knowledge may easily lead to negative perceptions. 
A high degree of uncertainties is typical when dealing with new technologies. When direct 
experience towards the risk is lacking, the public is forced to rely on different sources of 
information to form their opinion, but the different information sources can be contradictory 
and coming to an opinion is challenging. One of the information sources is the news media, 
which according to research has a significant effect on public perception. (Jönsson, 2011, 
Kaspersson et. al, 2000, Slovic, 2000) 
2.4. Policy, media and CCS projects in Norway and Finland 
For this research I have chosen Finland and Norway as countries that have had quite the 
opposite stories in terms of success in CCS technology. In this research, I will not go too deep 
into each country’s characteristics. However, it is important to have some idea of the general 
attitude towards new technologies, the media and also a little bit about the situation in which 
the local CCS projects are at the moment. 
Finland can be characterized a technocratic country. It has a history of being a pioneer country 
in mobile and internet technologies. In addition to France, it is the only EU country currently 
building new nuclear power. As the Finnish media researcher Väliverronen puts it, Finland’s 
national policy involves a “determination to be a successful forerunner in the field of new 
technology.” According to him, the Finnish media portrays mainly success stories of technology 
(based on economic benefits) and has avoided the critical debates and the technological 
pessimism that has swept over most Nordic and Western European countries (Väliverronen, 
2004). Also, the trust in institutions and experts is very high in Finland. According to a 
Eurobarometer survey, 83% think that decision making about science and technology should 
be based on experts’ advice on the risks and only 13% think it should be based on public’s 
views. The effect of the print media in science and technology is seen as very positive 
(Eurostat, 2005).  
In Finland, there are currently no CCS pilot projects. The only plan of a demonstration plant 
that there was, failed. It was the Meri-Pori project of the energy company Fortum. However, 
there are various applications of capturing CO2 from the industry and directing it to be used for 
further industrial purposes. Finland does not have the possibility to store CO2, so it would need 
to be transported abroad. Related to this, research is being done on carbonization technology, 
which would make it possible to store CO2 within the country. Bio-CCS - which is the 
combination of CCS with sustainable biomass conversion - is also of interest to Finland, since 
there are a lot of CO2 emissions due to the burning of biomass. Biomass has not been taken 
very well into account yet in the development of CCS, since it is more focused on fossil fuel 
sources. (Säntti, 2012)  
Norway is a big player in the energy field because of its vast energy supplies. There are heavy 
investments related to natural resources and technology is very important for maintaining the 
wealth due to these. Norway is currently one of the most advanced countries in developing 
CCS. It has been active in the field for more than ten years. There is no integrated CCS 
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legislation, but the existing laws have been amended and interpreted for the purposes of 
specific projects. A state owned entity, Gassnova plans, executes and safeguards the interests 
of CCS projects. (Global CCS Institute, 2009)  
The Norwegian government (through the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy), in conjunction 
with Statoil, has established a full-scale CCS plant in Mongstad. The aim is to have a full-scale 
CO2 capture plant operational at the site from 2014. In Sleipner, CO2 is captured from natural 
gas and injected into a saline formation 1000 meters below the sea bed. The project is 
operated by Statoil, the Norwegian oil and gas company. The Norwegian environmental 
authorities have been involved in this project for many years and the CO2 storage facility has 
been monitored to ensure that no leakage occurs. Through the State owned entity Gassnova, 
the Government also plans to build a full-scale CCS (retrofit) plant at the gas fired power plant 
at Karsto. The aim is to capture CO2 from the exhaust gas and transport it by pipeline for 
storage in geological formations under the sea bed. In Norway, extensive state aid has been 
given to support CCS. (Global CCS Institute, 2009) 
The Norwegian print media studied here is a regional, wide spread newspaper called 
Aftenposten. Schibsted, the creator and owner of Aftenposten, controls a third of all 
newspaper circulation. This media conglomerate owns the highest-selling newspaper in 
Norway, VG, and a chain of large, regional newspapers (Media Norge, which consists of 
Aftenposten, Bergens Tidende, Stavanger Aftenblad and Fædrelandsvennen). The rate of 
newspaper readership is very high in Norway (Østbye, 2010). 
3. Theoretical framework  
The theoretical framework of this thesis consists of theories of systemic risks, narrative policy 
analysis and framing of environmental risks in the media. I first describe the nature of systemic 
risks and what are the main issues of risks related to new technologies that involve 
uncertainties.  Then I move on to framing, more specifically how environmental risks are 
framed in the media and how it can effect public perception. After this I explain how narrative 
analysis can be used as a tool, for identifying framings. Then I describe Klinke and Renn’s 
(1999) Prometheus theory that I will use for analyzing the level of uncertainty in the framing of 
the articles and for discussing the implications of my findings. 
3.1. The nature of systemic risks 
Traditionally, risks have mostly been evaluated through analyses that focus on relations such 
as dose-response, cost-benefit and effect-probability. This kind of risk framing is quite limited 
since its focus is rather technocratic and decisionistic considering mainly economic aspects. For 
some hazards it is possible to calculate simple risk scenarios. For example the frequency and 
severity of motor vehicle accidents is statistically documented and there is hardly any 
uncertainty and the interpretation is quite unambiguous. (Renn et al., 2011) More often 
though, the facts only lead to a certain point and then human judgment is needed to complete 
the analysis. Additionally, some technologies are so new that risk assessment must be based 
on theoretical analyses instead of statistics. (Renn et al., 2011, Slovic et al., 2000)  
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Renn (et al. 2011) refers to these more complex risks as systemic risks. They are embedded in a 
wider societal context and require a more holistic approach to hazard identification, risk 
assessment, and risk management. Interdependencies need to be taken into account. 
Typically, a high degree of complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty is present.  
Complexity refers to difficulties in establishing direct causal links.  This could mean interactive 
effects, such as synergism and antagonism, long delay periods between cause and effect, 
individual variations, intervening variables and others (Renn et al., 2011). Science is lagging 
behind in understanding many chemical and physical phenomena. Endocrine disruptors - 
chemicals that interfere with the hormone system - are a good example of how traditional eco-
toxicology is insufficient for estimating the risks related to certain chemicals. Consequently, 
science-based risk management and decision making are not enough. Moreover, socio-
economic interrelations in a globalized world can be very hard to estimate, since there are no 
clear borders between the effects on different sectors of society nor between geographical 
areas. 
Uncertainty also implies that risk-related scientific data is limited or absent. Judging the 
severity of a risk based on uncertain parameters does not make much sense. Consequently, 
the strength of confidence in the estimated cause and effect chain is reduced. In such cases, 
the precautionary principle should be considered meaning the avoidance of the possible risk- 
even if its probability of occurrence was not certain. 
Ambiguity comes into play, when the same data can be interpreted in several ways, based on 
the assessor’s values. In this case, the scientific debate is not about the facts, but about what it 
all means for humans or for the environment. High levels of complexity and uncertainty favor 
the emergence of ambiguity, but there are also cases in which the risk is fairly simple and 
certain yet ambiguity is an issue. (Renn and Klinke, 2004)  
Most risks are in fact systemic, but they are handled as simple ones. This mishandling of risks 
can lead to social amplification or irresponsible attenuation of the risk, sustained controversy, 
deadlocks, legitimacy problems, unintelligible decision making, trade conflicts, border conflicts, 
expensive rebound measures, and lock-ins (Renn et al., 2011). CCS technology is a perfect 
example of systemic risk. As shown by Markusson (2012), it involves a great amount of inter-
linkages between different sectors of society. Below (Figure3. and Table1.) you can see how he 
illustrates them. 
 
Figure3. Risk interactions and inter-linkages from Markusson et al., 2012. 
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1. Political, policy and regulatory decisions about policy support, carbon prices, carbon reduction goals, liability 
rules, possible inclusion in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS), etc. massively impact on the economic and financial viability and their associated risks. 
2. The absence of credible regulatory regimes can decrease public confidence and can provoke opposition; a strong 
regulatory regime might give stakeholders confidence and increase public support. Public acceptance is likely to be 
necessary for political support, and impacts on policy and regulatory decisions. 
3. Selective public opposition to some technology variants (e.g. onshore storage) may decrease the variety of 
technological options viable for investment. 
4. Quick up-scaling risks locking-in to poor technology by reducing variety too early. Conversely, exploring a variety 
of different pathways risks spreading the resources too thinly. Policy and regulation will likely have a strong impact 
on this trade-off. 
5. Perception of storage risk is central to public acceptance, which in turn may influence how risk governance is 
shaped. 
6. Different governance and business models may impact on the speed and viability of development and up-scaling; 
a top-down push may increase speed, but also increase risks of technology failure. 
7. A strong top-down coordination of the CCS community could lead to a stronger consensus about what design 
choices are deemed promising. This would reduce the technological variety pursued. 
8. Learning-by-doing can help reduce investment as well as operational costs. Lowered costs, in turn, can stimulate 
investment and thus further learning-by-doing in a virtuous circle. 
9. Different business models for handling financial risks may fit best with different ways of integrating CCS systems. 
There may also be a costly process of experimentation involved in learning how to integrate and coordinate CCS 
systems. 
10. Publics may come to resent their shares of the extra cost of abatement caused by adding CCS. CCS cost 
improvements may improve societal acceptability. 
11. Uncertainty about future costs of CCS makes it difficult for policy makers to make decisions about the 
importance of CCS in the climate change mitigation portfolio compared to other options. (Markusson et al., 2012) 
Table 1. Risk interactions and inter-linkages from Markusson et al., 2012. 
3.2. Framing environmental risks in the media 
Risks can be defined as “mental constructions resulting from how people perceive uncertain 
phenomena and how their interpretations and responses are determined by social, political, 
economic and cultural contexts and judgments” (Renn et al., 2011). It is impossible to consider 
all the potential consequences of an event or activity, or be prepared for every possible risk 
scenario. Therefore we create risk perceptions and select which risks are to be considered and 
which can be ignored. People from different sectors of society often have different mental 
constructions as their starting point, meaning they frame risks in different ways. (Renn et al., 
2011)  
 
24 
 
One way to see framing comes down to who is included, what is included and what is the 
scope and mandate of the process. Inclusion has different forms, such as roundtables, open 
forums, negotiated rule-making exercises, mixed advisory committees and mediation – which 
in this study is the main interest. Inclusion is important when identifying the phenomena I 
discussed earlier; uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity, since various sources of information 
and different perspectives need to be considered. What different actors label as risk problems 
varies. In this sense, inclusion aims at integrating all relevant knowledge and concerns of 
stakeholders involved. Inclusion is also an essential part of democracy, which involves the right 
for people to participate in decision making, especially when they are affected by the risks in 
question. Another quality of inclusion is that the more people involved in weighing the pros 
and cons, the more robust the outcome. (Renn et al., 2011) 
Since the data of this study is from newspaper media, it is useful to understand something 
about how the media frames environmental risks and how it can affect public perception. 
Jönsson (2011) studied media’s framing of environmental risks in the context of the Baltic Sea. 
In the next paragraphs, I will go through some of the phenomena she discusses in her paper. 
As stated in her paper, the general consensus among scholars today- is that the media has a 
decisive role in governance, policy making and communication. The news media influences 
public discourse by determining the subjects being discussed and who participates in the 
discussion. It plays a crucial role in defining problems and therefore in framing environmental 
issues as risks. In the context of the media, the most interesting aspects of framing are the way 
certain parts of a text are made more salient and the way these frames influence people’s 
perception and construction of reality. 
Mediatization refers to the media becoming the main frame of reference in society. How 
politics is framed and perceived and what the terms of action are for the participants in public 
discourse- is decided by the media. The media is a central player in politics and it is in constant 
interaction with it. Another term that describes the role of the media in political discourse is 
agenda-setting. It refers to the media’s decisive role in how much attention a certain issue 
receives in the news and consequently how much importance it is given.  
News has to be interesting and clear- for people to read it. To achieve this, journalists need to 
frame the problem. There are often discrepancies between scientists and journalists over what 
should be communicated, since often journalists do not pick the risks that the scientists 
consider the most relevant.  Journalists use different techniques for reporting scientific 
knowledge, especially when it involves risks and uncertainties. Popularization, which includes 
reduction of complexities, is frequently used. This often leads to making science look more 
certain than it is. It is close to Renn’s (et al., 2011) discussion on handling systemic risks as 
simple. He warns about the negative consequences such simplification might have (see 3.1.) 
Another similar form of uncertainty rhetoric is making it seem as if certainty could be reached 
in the future.  
Conflict or tension often draws people’s attention. So, sometimes journalists frame scientific 
uncertainty as an expert controversy for example by challenging scientific knowledge with 
other kind of knowledge or contradicting different sources of scientific expertise. Kaspersson 
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et. al (2000), have studied the way the frames of the media can affect risk perception by 
amplifying it. Sometimes risks that are minor according to technical experts, receive massive 
public reactions which can be accompanied by substantial social and economic impacts. This is 
due to risk events interacting with psychological, social and cultural processes. It is important 
to make risk analysis more sensitive to this sort of situations, which are referred to as 
amplification of risk. Information flow, being for example the news media, can become a key 
ingredient in public response and consequently it acts as a major agent in the amplification of 
risk.  
Attributes of information that may influence the social amplification are volume, the degree to 
which information is disputed, the extent of dramatization, and the symbolic connotations of 
the information. Large volumes of information flow may act as a risk amplifier. Also the 
volume of the topics handled within the information flow has an effect on the risk perception, 
drawing attention to certain issues and away from others. Debates among experts enhance 
the feeling of uncertainty among the public decreasing trust in the authorities and in their 
understanding of the hazards. Dramatization is a very effective means of amplification. 
(Kaspersson et. al, 2000) 
To conclude, the media is closely tied to the perception of systemic risks as it plays an 
important role in portraying the presence of uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. Journalists 
and editors can chose what kind of framing of a risk they want to give out. They can either 
simplify or amplify risks- making them look simple or systemic. Especially in ambiguous 
situations, the media can have a strong influence on how people end up perceiving an issue 
that could be interpreted in numerous ways. 
3.3. Narrative policy analysis as a tool for media research 
So far I have discussed theories of risk perception and framing. This is because as I started 
work on this thesis, I set out to look for the framing in the studied articles. Through the 
process, I became familiar with narrative analysis. With it, the story flow and dramaturgy of 
news articles can be identified and described, which is connected to how the media frames the 
issues in question. Consequently, I found that framing and narrative analysis work together 
quite nicely.  
Emery Roe's(1994) definition of policy narrative goes along the lines of the definition of a 
story. It has a beginning, a middle and an end and revolves around a sequence of events or 
positions in which something is said to happen or from which something is said to follow. 
Policy narratives have the objective to make people assume something or act in a certain way. 
They can have a particularly significant role when establishing and fixing assumptions related 
to highly ambiguous questions. In the context of this research, systemic risks are often 
ambiguous, as has been shown previously (3.1.).  
Roe (1992) explains the usefulness of narrative policy analysis through what he calls the 
“schizophrenia between policy analysis as a profession and social science as a discipline”. -For 
every article or book on how to address a policy problem, social scientists produce three on 
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how the problems in question cannot be adequately defined let alone addressed because of all 
the uncertainties involved. So, there becomes a need to tackle the uncertainties. This is where 
literary theory comes into play, since it offers approaches for interpreting highly uncertain and 
complex policy issues. This is due to the fact that one of the parallel tasks of literary criticism 
has been the evaluation of reports whose empirical or representational merits are debatable.  
The literary framework chosen for policy analysis should enable the analysis of the stories and 
scenarios that are told as a means of simplifying or complexifying the issue in question. It 
should also be able to address the uncertainties that arise from the conflicts between stories. 
Narrative policy analysis seeks to identify the larger story that the different stories of the issue 
tell when put together. (Roe, 1992) This description is very similar to the aims of this thesis, 
only the story teller has been delimited to the media. 
Narratives have also proven to be an effective means of analyzing media related to policy 
issues that involve uncertainties. They are both the visible outcome of differences in policy 
beliefs and the equally visible outcome of political strategizing. Policy beliefs and political 
strategies found in policy narratives are not random occurrences. They are arguably stable, 
political strategies that are predictable (McBeth et. al, 2007).  
Fischer and Forrester (1996) discuss the importance of understanding the argumentative 
processes related to policy planning. According to them, problem solutions depend on how the 
problems are constructed, which is in many ways a matter of argumentation. We can ask not 
only what is argued, but how it is done. When argumentative nature is taken into account, we 
can appreciate how it becomes a means of agenda-setting, an important term in media 
research (see 3.2.). As Hajer (1996), who has also used narrative analysis to for policy analysis 
puts it, whether a situation is perceived as a political problem depends on the narrative in 
which it is discussed. He also puts emphasis on understanding that language is not only a 
medium, but a means that not only describes, but also creates the world. 
There are many ways of putting narrative analysis into practice. I found that most narrative 
analysis approaches were thought for the purposes of analyzing policy data. In the case of this 
thesis the data was from the media. So, I decided to use an approach that was described by a 
Finnish media researcher (Kantola, 1999). In this method, the story is first divided into scenes, 
for example according to changes in time or place of the story or turning points that take the 
story forward. Then the tensions between scenes are studied.  
The aim is to find the problem, to which the story is seeking a solution, the goal of the action in 
the story and the forces that stand against each other. After this, the dramatic structure is 
analyzed, meaning further analysis of the central tension and studying how it develops. The 
turning point of the tension is often referred to as the golden section of a story. Traditionally 
the tension slowly builds up, reaches its climax and is finally lifted. Stories can end with a 
conclusion or solution or they can end in an open question with the conflict left in the air. 
Sometimes it is neither, but the story goes on and on and never concludes in any way. This is a 
typical characteristic of soap operas, which aim at keeping the audience wanting for more. 
(Kantola, 1999) 
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3.4. The Prometheus theory 
Klinke and Renn (1999) use Greek myths in an attempt to evaluate and classify the risks related 
to new technologies and improve their management. Interestingly, they show that many of the 
ancient stories apply very adequately to risk situations that societies continue to face today. 
The story of Prometheus- that is the starting point of their theory- reflects the point of change 
in a society which happens when a new technology is so significant that it creates a shift to a 
whole new era. Such a shift was the case of Prometheus when he brought fire to the use of 
people, which enabled them to start cultivating land and make metal. It meant an end to the 
era of hunter-gatherers. 
Times of great opportunity bring along risks. In Greek mythology, Pandora's Box is a symbol of 
this. Pandora was incredibly beautiful, but there was a catch, since as you open her box, evil 
things swarm out and take over. In the legend, Prometheus was able to resist the temptation 
of Pandora, but his brother Epimetheus wasn’t. So Pandora's Box opened releasing the evil 
content that was to cause pain and suffering and haunt humans thereafter. However, hope 
was left in the box. 
The story of Prometheus can also be applied to the context of the industrial revolution. The 
1950s were characterized by an almost euphoric belief in scientific and technological progress. 
There was a promise of unlimited energy, wealth and comfort. Major infectious diseases 
appeared to be defeated, natural forces tamed and technological advances secured. It was like 
the time of Prometheus, providing all kinds of wonderful tools to make anything possible. 
Epimetheus was present in echoing the promises by believing all evil could be wiped away.  
The domination of complacency (Prometheus) and hubris (Epimetheus) over anticipatory 
planning and caution is particularly dangerous in times of new technologies. And so it was 
discovered in the 1960s and 1970s, that there is a limit to growth. However, the promise of the 
unlimited was still very tempting and belief in technological solutions dominated over 
precaution. In 1986, the situation changed along three major disasters: Chernobyl, the 
Challenger accident and the pollution of the Rhine River. Pandora had opened her box and 
people were confronted with the negative side effects of new technologies. The blind trust in 
science and technology started to crack.  
Nowadays, the situation is rather ambiguous. Many instances, one of them being the media, 
can affect the stance that is taken (see 3.4.). It is recognized that opportunities rise out of 
uncertainties, but that it goes both ways, as opportunities contain risks. It is known, that too 
much caution can be harmful, but so can carelessness. Therefore, risk analysis is not enough, 
but strategies of resilience and flexibility are needed along with safety improvements. Myths 
can serve as guidelines for understanding the situations involved with facing new technologies 
and trying to find a middle way. As Klinke and Renn (1999) describe in their paper:  
“Myths are reminders of the genuine forces that are inevitably present in the making of new 
technological eras. They can guide us through the clouds of uncertainty and ambiguity 
associated with new scientific advances and technological breakthroughs. Far from providing 
recipes for managing technologies and risks, they can help us to orient ourselves in the tension 
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between courage and caution and to create powerful images that provide sources for 
understanding and handling risks in modern societies.” 
When both probability of occurrence and the extent of damage can be assessed, the reliability 
of assessment is high. The risk is in the normal area and can be assessed with traditional risk-
benefit analysis. What is of interest- are the risks whose reliability of assessment is low, 
statistical uncertainty is high, catastrophic potential can reach alarming dimensions and 
systematic knowledge about the distribution of consequences is missing. The risks can also 
generate global irreversible damage, which can accumulate over time or frighten people 
causing massive mobilizations. These are all typical characteristics of systemic risks (Renn et. 
al, 2011), which were described earlier (see 3.1.). 
Klinke and Renn (1999) have described risks containing these qualities and come up with six 
categories. The categories were given names after Greek myths. CCS technology could be 
placed in almost any of the risk classes, depending on the way it is looked at and whether risks 
towards the technology or due to the technology is in question. However, the most relevant 
risk classes based on the data of this study are Cyclops, Pythia, Pandora and Medusa. These 
will be discussed more in detail in the analysis section (see Ch.5.). 
 
RISK 
CLASS 
PROBABILITY MAGNITUDE OTHER CRITERIA TYPICAL EXAMPLES 
Damocles low high not decisive nuclear energy, dams, 
large-scale chemical 
facilities 
Cyclops uncertain high not decisive nuclear early warning 
systems, earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions, AIDS 
Pythia uncertain uncertain not decisive greenhouse effect, BSE, 
genetic engineering 
Pandora uncertain uncertain high persistency POPs, endocrine 
disruptors 
Cassandra high high high delay anthropogenic climate 
change, destabilization of 
terrestric ecosystems 
Medusa low low high mobilization electromagnetic fields 
Table 2. Prometheus risk categories. (Klinke and Renn, 1999) 
Decision makers face a difficult dilemma. On one hand technical expertise is necessary but not 
sufficient for decision making. On the other hand public perception reflect the values and 
preferences to be considered, but are partially driven by biases. For decision making to be 
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effective, these two should be combined. Klinke and Renn (1999) explain their attempt of 
doing so as follows:  
“Our proposal for risk evaluation, risk classification and risk management is the attempt to 
initiate a deliberative process, in which rational criteria of evaluation are used, public values 
inserted, and effective strategies communicated to those who are affected by the decision.”  
More concretely, this would mean a cooperative planning process where uncertainties are 
discussed with those affected by the risks and the evaluation of options is performed in a 
dialogue between experts, stakeholders and members of the general public. 
I will mainly use the Prometheus theory for the final part of my research, where I search for 
the implications of my findings for policy making. If I am able to identify the risk classes from 
the data, I can use the equivalent risk management strategies as suggestions for managing the 
risks related to CCS based on the risk portrayal by the media. On a quite general level, the 
management strategies are as you can observe in the table (Table 3.) below. 
 
Management Risk class Extent of 
damage 
Probability of 
occurrence 
Strategies for action 
 
 
 
Science-based 
 
Damocles 
 
 
? high 
 
 
? low 
 
 
? Reducing disaster potential 
? Ascertaining probability 
? Increasing resilience 
? Preventing surprises 
? Emergency management 
 
 
Cyclops 
 
? high 
 
? uncertain 
 
 
 
Precautionary 
 
 
Pythia 
 
 
 
? uncertain 
 
 
? uncertain 
 
? Implementing 
precautionary principle 
? Developing substitutes 
? Improving knowledge 
? Reduction and containment 
? Emergency management 
 
 
Pandora 
 
? uncertain 
 
? uncertain 
 
 
 
Discursive 
 
Cassandra 
 
 
? high 
 
? high 
 
? Consciousness-building 
? Confidence-building 
? Public participation 
? Risk communication 
? Contingency management 
 
 
Medusa 
 
? low 
 
? low 
Table 3. Overview of the risk management strategies. 
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Based on the management strategies (Table3.), risks have a certain dynamic (Figure  4.) in how 
they can be reduced and moved from one class to another. In general, the measures are 
divided into two approaches: one is to improve knowledge through research and the other 
consists of liability and regulatory measures tackling class-specific quantities like probability, 
extent of damage, irreversibility, persistence, delay effect and mobilization. Knowledge 
improvement generally moves the risk from one class to another and the regulatory 
framework moves from precautionary strategies to more science-based ones. 
 
Figure 4. Risk dynamic (Renn and Klinke,1999). 
The movement of the risk to the normal area means it becomes possible to assess the risk with 
traditional risk analysis methods, in other words it becomes simple (Renn et al., 2011). It does 
not mean the risks are gone. Once the risks move to the intolerable area, substitution or ban 
should be considered. A slight problem with this scheme is, that expanding knowledge is often 
the recommendation for reducing the risk, but the key issue in cases like CCS is that knowledge 
expansion is not always possible. Still, the risks need to be dealt with. What is useful though is 
identifying the issues in which knowledge is not available and other management strategies 
should be considered. 
4. Methods and data 
The data of this study consists of articles from two of the wide spread newspaper medias of 
Finland and Norway. The newspaper media studied in Finland, Helsingin sanomat is the most 
wide spread newspaper in the Nordic countries, with a circulation of 383 361 (LT-Levikkitilasto, 
2010). Aftenposten, with a circulation of 239 831 (Ulkoasiainministeriö, 2012), is the second 
most wide spread media in Norway. Both are regional medias. 
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For the search I used the archives of Helsingin Sanomat and the web page of Aftenposten. The 
search words in Finnish were “CCS” and “hiilidioksidin talteenotto ja varastointi ” (carbon 
capture and sequestration). I also took into account the articles that were referred to in the 
ones I found with the search words. In the Aftenposten search the search words were “CCS” 
and “karbonfangst og lagring” (carbon capture and sequestration). The amount of articles 
found in Helsingin Sanomat was 23 and in Aftenposten 25. I named the articles HS meaning 
Helsingin sanomat and AP meaning Aftenposten and a number (i.e. HS2, AP20 etc.). The 
numbering was done randomly in the same order as the articles were downloaded. 
Through the reading of the articles, the inadequate articles were excluded. For example, many 
articles discussed climate solutions in general and only mentioned CCS as one of them without 
going very deep into the subject. Also the letters to the editor were excluded, because there 
were so few that they would have not made a coherent contribution to the data. Finally, 14 
articles from Finnish newspaper media and 15 from Norwegian newspaper media were used 
for the analysis (see Annex1. for the data list).  
Automatic translation was used to translate the Norwegian articles into English, but the 
original ones were kept for reference in cases of obvious translation mistakes. Though I am 
generally skeptical about automatic translations, I must say these translations worked 
surprisingly well. Based on my knowledge of Swedish, I was able to assess the translations’ 
reliability and correct inaccurate translations. I also translated the quotes from Finnish articles 
that were used for illustration in the analysis section (Ch.5.). 
I began the analysis by coding the data in order to extract the parts handling the risks of CCS 
from the rest of the text. More specifically, I coded all the references to problems and 
solutions related to CCS technology. The coding was done mainly based on Markusson’s (et al., 
2012) uncertainty categories. In the cases of problems or solutions, that didn't match the 
categories, I added new ones. This process was done with the help of the data analysis 
program Atlas.ti. It led me to having each article represented in quotes related to the risks of 
CCS. 
After the coding, I arranged the coded quotations into stories, in such a manner that the 
tensions and turning points of the story became visible. Using the ideas of narrative analysis, I 
divided the quotes into sequences based on changes in “scenery” (see 3.3.). I named them (i.e. 
background, critique, response, conflict, conclusion etc.) and then I sketched the storylines (in 
worm-like lines, see Figure 4a. and b.) according to how the tension in the story goes up and 
down. Unfortunately, the terms I used for describing the quotes can only be observed in 
Finnish in the analyzed articles (Appendice2.).  
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With this process, I aimed at finding the central themes of the articles, the turning points, the 
conflicting elements, how the stories flow and whether they end up in a clear conclusion. The 
figures presented on the next page are meant to give a basic visual idea of the sketches. For 
further, more specific observation, all the sketches can be found as appendices (Appendice2.). 
Figure 5a. Example of a storyline sketch. 
 
Figure 5b. Example of a storyline sketch. 
33 
 
 
I searched for similar storylines based on my sketches and divided the articles into groups 
based on them. This narrative analysis methodology enabled the first categorization of the 
articles. After dividing the articles into groups, I looked for similarities within the groups of 
stories to find the frames of each group. Some of the articles were rearranged based on 
common characteristics in their content. This led to the final categories, ready for analyzing. 
I was able to identify five categories based on the storylines and the content of the articles. I 
named them as: deterministic stories, critical voices, simple solutions stories, don’t believe the 
hype stories and tossing the ball around stories. In the first group, the storylines were short 
and ended up in a conclusion and the central characteristic was expressing that we cannot 
avoid CCS. The second group was more based on the content, than the structure, since they 
were the clearly critical articles. In the third, the storylines had the same structure as in the 
first group, but the content focused on presenting a solution in a quite simplified manner (i.e. 
we only need to…to get CCS working). The fourth group had a lot of variation in its dramatic 
structure and ended in a tension point. For the fifth category, a long storyline combined to an 
open ending was typical.  
5. The analysis 
The articles fell under the five story types as presented below: 
1. The deterministic stories: “There is no other option for mitigation than CCS.”   
Total of 5 articles: HS13, HS22 and AP15, AP16, AP22. 
2. The critical voices: “We need to consider this.” 
Total of 3 articles: HS6, HS8 and AP21. 
3. The simple solutions stories: “All we need now is to…” 
Total of 8 articles: HS9, HS15, HS16, HS18 and AP5, AP6, AP9, AP11. 
4. Don’t believe the hype stories: “This is a huge opportunity…although there is one 
problem…oh and another…but CCS is still absolutely fabulous!” 
Total of 9 articles: HS1, HS2, HS20 and AP3, AP4, AP8, AP10, AP13, AP20. 
5. Tossing the ball around stories: “I think it’s good, you think it’s bad, they say we can’t, 
others say we should…” 
Total of 4 articles: HS14, HS17, HS19 and AP2. 
 
Next I will go more into detail in the analysis of each group of stories. I will present quotes 
from each group in order to give an insight of their main characteristics. The Finnish quotes 
have been translated into English. Some quotes were slightly condensed, since the aim was to 
present the main content. Translation errors of the original automatic translations were 
corrected. Some context providing remarks for the reader were also added.  
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In each group, I will look for the presence of uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (see 3.1.). I 
link these to the Prometheus categories (Klinke and Renn, 1999) to see what would be the 
corresponding policy recommendations based on this material.  
The quantity of the data is not adequate for sound assumptions on the differences of the two 
countries based on quantity. Qualitative differences however, are spotted more easily. In the 
parts where the data does seem to imply differences, I will carefully bring them up. 
I also look at whether phenomena related to the media’s framing of new technologies can be 
observed.  
5.1. Deterministic stories 
The deterministic stories portray the arguments for CCS as being the only option we have for 
mitigating climate change. The central argument seems to be- that the world is so dependent 
on cheap and abundant coal reserves, that they must use CCS. Developing countries are 
especially discussed, since many of them have very polluting technology and at the same time 
a lock-in to the infrastructure supporting it, which makes it hard to get rid of coal. The articles 
discuss specifically the situations in China, India, Russia and South-Africa but also developing 
countries in general. It is said that it is unrealistic to think that the use of coal will end and that 
it is a way to ensure economic growth for developing countries. Its abundance and cheapness 
is said to be significant also in industrial countries. Also, it is mentioned that the countries 
really deciding the fate of coal in the world are China and the US.  
According to the Norwegian media, one key issue seems to be whether CCS becomes a part of 
the climate agreement and CDM. This is related to finance and making the technology viable. 
Norway’s role is portrayed as a pro-active country that can help developing countries in 
financing their projects and setting up the technology. Also other financial aspects, such as the 
importance of achieving permission for state aid in Norway, are mentioned.  
Finland is portrayed as a more passive player, with little influence on what happens. Finnish 
media discusses mostly what is happening in other countries. This is probably because of the 
fact that there are no on-going demonstration projects at the moment. Finland seems to be 
mainly a bystander in the process, possibly acting once CCS is already moving forward.  
Below are some example quotes of the stories’ deterministic character (Quote 1.-5.). 
Quote1. (AP15.) “There is no other solution to the problem of climate change than large scale 
capture and storage.”  
Quote2. (AP16.) “Few other options exist to ensure the countries’ economic growth.”  
 Quote3. (AP22.) “More countries will be unable to achieve their climate goals without such 
technology.”  
Quote4. (HS13.) “In the end, what we decide about using coal in Europe has rather ideological 
implications than concrete ones. There are two reasons for this: China and the USA.”  
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Quote5. (HS22.) “Kaija [from Helsinki Energy] names some of the indisputable advantages of 
coal. The reserves are enough for hundreds of years. It is relatively easy to extract and store. 
The transportation is easy and cheap.”  
In the Norwegian media, there is little attention towards the problems, and the ones that are 
mentioned, are portrayed quite shortly. For example, it is said that something must happen for 
CCS to go forward, mostly getting financial support, but not so directly that there is a problem 
or a risk due to the technology itself. In Finnish media, problems are given quite a lot more 
attention, but they still end in very deterministic conclusions. Values are quite visibly present 
in these articles. They go along the lines that industrial countries can’t be so unfair as to 
prohibit economic growth in developing countries by standing in the way of CCS.  
To link these stories to Klinke and Renn’s (1999) risk classes, these stories portray the risks as 
being in the normal area, in other words, calculable enough not to worry us. Maybe the 
thought is that CCS is so inevitable- that we shouldn’t pay too much attention to the risks. In 
one article leakage is mentioned as a risk, and also the question of liability related to it. 
Straight after, the risk is undermined by saying that leakage is 100% without CCS, so the given 
image is that we would know the extent of damage in the case of leakage. This is not really the 
case if it is a matter of a sudden large leakage, since the quick release of large amounts of CO2 
could have very unpredictable consequences, which cannot be compared to the slowly 
releasing emissions that come from the industry and from energy production.  
This is a good example of how complexity is slightly ignored in these articles. Uncertainty is 
more present in terms of not knowing whether CCS will be too expensive or slow. Ambiguity is 
also present in the values saying we should not stand in the way of economic growth in 
developing countries. In terms of media, simplifying is a way to popularize news, to make it 
more understandable or inviting for readers (Jönsson, 2011). 
5.2. Critical voices stories 
As the title suggests, the critical voice stories tell us what the main arguments against CCS are. 
They seem to be that CCS is not a good means of mitigation, since it is too slow and there are 
possibly better options to invest in, such as renewable energy. Other mitigation efforts are said 
to be more cost-efficient. Furthermore, lock-in in fossil fuels is seen as a problem. Leakage and 
its possible effect on ground-waters is also a major concern. Below you can see examples of 
the rhetoric of these articles (Quote6.-8.). 
Quote6. (HS6.) “The expensive technology still involves a lot of significant technical problems 
and ecological risks.”  
Quote7. (HS8.)”Instead, it would be important to focus more on cutting down CO2 emissions 
and improving energy efficiency. Furthermore, investments should be made in safer, less 
environmentally intensive technologies, in developing clean renewable energy and using all 
means possible to enhance its implementation.   
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 Quote8. (AP21.) “The authorities are considering building a plant for carbon capture in 
conjunction with a gas-fired power plant, but a professor of petroleum economics Petter 
Omundsen, believes there is very little cost-effectiveness compared with other mitigation.”  
In these articles the general stance seems to be that the risks of CCS are not worth taking, in 
other words, in the risk the Prometheus risk classification (Klinke and Renn, 1999) they would 
have already moved into the intolerable area. One article puts emphasis on the environmental 
damage CCS could do, mainly spoiling ground waters, which would relate to risk class Cyclops 
since extent of damage is known, but probability of occurrence is not. Another article 
underlines that CCS is not a cost-effective climate measure. This would go into the risk class 
Pandora, since it refers to searching for substitutes to avoid a non-viable option of climate 
mitigation. In the third article, it is not as clearly stated that CCS is not a good option, since it is 
mentioned as a possible additional measure at some time in the future. However, besides this 
remark the article is very critical. It ends with saying that a sudden burst of CO2 can kill. Such 
remarks can be quite dramatic and affect public perception by amplifying risk perception 
(Kaspersson et al.,2000). This would belong to the risk class Cyclops, for the same reasons as 
the first of the three articles.  
5.3. Simple solutions stories 
The solution oriented stories tell us in a simplified manner, what the key issues holding back or 
progressing CCS development are. Generally, the stories do not focus much on whether CCS is 
a good option, but what should be done to make it happen. In almost all the articles the 
solution has something to do with bringing down the price of CCS, only the means vary a bit. 
Based on the solutions presented, it is possible to build a scenario of simplified successful CCS. 
According to it:  
1. CCS needs to become part of the new climate agreement and CDM. There will be no 
investments, if there are no guarantees on emissions prices. 
2. CCS needs to receive financial support from both the state and the industry. Mechanisms for 
raising funds for construction work need to be set up (Norway, where project got 80% state 
funding). 
3. CCS needs to be good business, so the industry will invest. Even so, in the transition phase 
(before emissions become expensive enough) support is needed. Several countries need to 
share the bill. 
4. Taxation and other legislative measures are good. Setting binding limits to emissions is risky 
though, because companies need to be able to calculate the viability of the investment. If the 
limits are too tough, there may be no investments. 
5. Legislation allowing transport of CO2 across borders needs to be put in place. 
6. To insure public acceptance, it is better if storage facilities are built on inhabited lands. 
Openness about the risks and vast information spreading is also very important.  
There are two articles (HS16. and HS18.) that differ from the others. They have a similar 
dramatic structure and also a solution oriented position towards CCS, but the solution they 
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focus on is public acceptance. According to one of them, the key is to build storage facilities in 
uninhabited areas along with working on better and more open informing of the CCS projects 
and their risks. The other suggests that by enhancing the company’s commitment to 
renewable energy and by supporting traditional lifestyles in the areas of massive 
environmental damage due to coal production, the problems can be decreased. One of these 
articles is the only one of the whole data- where the negative effects of the coal industry are 
mentioned. Typically, aspects like the effects of coal mining on the environment and air 
pollution to human health are considered scarcely when discussing the pros and cons of CCS. 
Next I will present some example quotes of the simple solution oriented character of the 
articles (Quote9.-16.): 
Quote9. (HS9.) “The development is completely dependent on whether we will get a global, 
long-term binding climate agreement.”  
Quote10. (HS15.) “Companies must be able to calculate the viability of the project in the 
investment phase, also after the supported demonstration phase.”  
Quote11. (HS16.) “Failure was mainly due to the fact that information spreading was the 
companies’ responsibility and they did not understand that nobody wants such a storage 
facility in their neighborhood.” 
Quote12. (HS18.) “Open mining is not the biggest concern of the local peoples, but the bad 
economic situation and migration. Vattenfall supports the Sorbs living in mining areas by 
enhancing their social and ethnic identity.”  
Quote13. (AP5.) “It is now important to raise the funds required and also to bring mechanisms 
to finance the construction of demonstration plants.”  
Quote14. (AP6.) “Now it seems the EU will pass Norway in the race to reach the moon first. The 
EU has set harsh requirements that facilities will be ready in 2015. In total there will be talk of a 
subsidy between six and nine billion euros.”  
Quote15. (AP9.) “It is gratifying that the framework for state aid has now been resolved. The 
development of CO2 capture to become an effective instrument in environmental policy is in full 
swing due to this decision.”  
Quote16. (AP11.) “But it goes without saying that if this should be done in the large scale 
climate change requires, several countries participate and share the bill.”  
In most of the articles it seems as if the extent of damage is known, which is linked to not 
getting enough investments in CCS and consequently not progressing with the technology. The 
solution is the ability to calculate the viability of investments, which depends mostly on the 
dynamics of emissions prices and on setting legal framework to support the technology, mainly 
a new climate agreement. However, whether these solutions happen, is uncertain, so 
probability of occurrence is not known.  
This way we could link the risk portrayal of these articles to risk class Cyclops, in which only 
one side of the risks is seen. In this risk class, there is often too little knowledge about causal 
parameters, or too little observation time in which to identify cyclic regularities. In other cases 
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human behavior influences the probability of occurrence so that this criterion becomes 
uncertain. The strategy recommendations for this class coincide well, since for risk class 
Cyclops they suggest mainly science-based measures and here in these articles, a clear 
scenario of successful CCS can be made as shown above. A scenario could be seen as an option 
for science-based measures. Ambiguity is not given much attention.  
The articles that discuss public acceptability could be linked to risk class Medusa, since they 
discuss avoiding high mobilization effects of supposedly known risks. In this case discursive 
strategies of reducing the risks would be most important. 
5.4. Don’t believe the hype stories  
These stories tell us, how CCS is being hyped in the media, especially in Norway. However, 
between the lines there is a significant amount of uncertainties, problems and doubt. These 
may bring out characteristics of systemic risks most accurately. A lot of variation in the 
dramatic structure is typical for these stories. Based on their content they can be divided into 
two groups. In one, the stories start out with a great promise the technology has to offer and 
with a lot of hype, but surprisingly they end in a very negative tone. In the other group, the 
story moves quite the opposite way. They start with a negative tone then head towards a 
more positive, CCS supportive ending (Figure 6.-8.) I will give examples of both types.  
Figure 6. 
Figure 7. 
HS2. 
There has been a decision on a huge EU funding package for CCS.  
CCS is the industry’s wet dream. 
? 
But will the technology make it in time to mitigate climate change? 
The costs per power plant in industrial scale can be up to a billion euros  
and the storage options are not known well enough. 
   ? 
             This is too slow,  
I can’t see how it would be possible to get 12 test projects running by 2015, 
said John Barry from Shell. 
 
HS20.  
 
There could be a 24 h emissions free power plant, ZeroGen project could be 
the savior of the coal industry. 
? 
No-one knows the price of storing CO2, but it’s not cheap. 
? 
The Ministry of Energy in the US just cut the funding of a FutureGen power plant, because 
it ran out of patience due to tripled expenses. 
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Figure8. 
 
Next I will present some of the more hopefully ending storylines (Figures 9.-14.): 
Figure 9. 
Figure10. 
HS1. 
The abandoning of the project supports the often repeated critical opinion: The storage 
technology to mitigate climate change may be promising, but without public support or 
significantly higher emissions prices its commercial realization is still far ahead. 
? 
If there is a world-wide break-through in the technology, its markets will be huge. 
? 
In Finland the abandoning of Meri-Pori means that it is at least  
too late to get to the front line. 
AP20. 
 
Air capture of CO2 is being developed and costs are a fraction compared to Mongstad.  
This is going to change the world. 
 ? 
Professionals with less detailed knowledge of technical solutions, but without vested 
interest on the projects believe the cost will be far higher, fear that air capture will steal 
resources from cheaper and more efficient technologies. 
? 
It is not without reason that we have such a big climate challenge… 
there is no simple technological fix,  
said researcher Helge Drange. 
 
AP3. 
 
There was a Hallelujah mood for CCS in the panel. 
Those who are against CCS will not fight climate change, said Hauge from Bellona. 
? 
There is still fear of leakage and the problem that CCS could take resources from 
renewables. 
   ? 
At yesterday’s hearing it was almost only people who believed in building bridges theory,  
but outside the conference room it is obviously different. 
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Figure 11. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. 
 AP8. 
The government fears that the CO2 -capture at Mongstad, the governments ”moon 
landing” will be significantly delayed. 
? 
Some countries have also expressed direct opposition to accept CCS technology. 
? 
We need positive signals from the EU system in the near future 
if we are to keep deadlines. 
AP4. 
Norway is no longer in the world [leader in CCS]. 
? 
This is a very complicated system with difficult commercial and technological processes. 
In addition, it questions the health, safety and security. 
? 
The safety question is not whether the technology exists, but whether it can be expected 
home. We will not land in the moon in any space craft, but one that the rest of the world 
also can use. 
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Figure 13. 
Figure 14. 
 
What is interesting about these articles is the great variation in arguments for and against CCS. 
They portray uncertainties a lot stronger than the previous categories of articles, because 
there is a lot of dispute. One can observe the great contradictions there are between opinions 
and how a great promise can be completely shattered or how a hopeless situation could turn 
out to fill the hope that is in the air. 
There is clearly some concern about getting the financing in place and examples are given of 
failure in funding and projects going down. All of the described projects still seem to need 
something to move forward, even if it is the “only remaining” thing. There is also tension 
between not going for it and consequently losing a business opportunity or on the other hand, 
being bravely in the front line and failing. Just as suggested in the Prometheus theory, where 
tensions between caution and carelessness - risk and opportunity are described (Klinke and 
Renn, 1999). 
AP10. 
Norway should be allowed to use up to 100 percent state aid at Mongstad. 
? 
It seems a hopeless use of money to invest billions of euros on something that might seem 
far into the future. 
? 
I believe that Norway both have good experience and technology to store CO2. They can 
show people that this is possible. 
AP13. 
Statoil is closer to commercialization. 
? 
Considerably larger volumes of CO2 are needed for this to be shop [viable]. 
This requires significant public boost in the mean time in the form of 
financial contributions, also the licencing rules and legal framework in place. 
? 
It only remains to ratify a directive that allows the transport of CO2 across borders. 
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A strongly present theme in these articles is the hope related to CCS as a means of mitigating 
climate change and as a savior of cheap and abundant energy. At the same time there is a 
notable concern about whether the technology will be in place in time before we reach 
catastrophic effects of climate change. Related to this, there is concern also about the 
technology stealing resources from other solutions and creating lock-in to fossil fuels. In both 
cases time and the persistency of choices is a significant element.  
In connection to the Greek myths risk classes, as in these articles, time is very much present in 
risk class Pandora in which it relates to the high persistency of the choices that are made. 
Probability of occurrence and extent of damage are uncertain. The element of hope present in 
these stories is also very typical for Pandora, but great danger is always present when opening 
the box of promises (Klinke and Renn, 1999). In this case, precautionary strategies are 
recommended to reduce the risks. 
From the media point of view, these articles could be seen as an example of the media making 
the stories more interesting by adding controversy, dispute and dramatization. Typical 
uncertainty rhetoric is also making it seem as certainty could be reached in the future (see 
3.2.) (Kaspersson et al., 2000). 
The amount of these articles in the Norwegian media is clearly larger than in Finnish media. It 
can be quite clearly observed, how the technology is hyped in Norway. Surprisingly, many 
disappointments are also brought up, which could end up amplifying risk perception. In Finnish 
media, there is only one hype story that ends positively. 
5.5. Tossing the ball around stories 
The tossing the ball around stories are examples of soap opera -like media stories, where the 
discussion goes on and on with no clear ending. Often the ending is almost irrelevant to the 
discussion in the article and gives some whole new point of view. It is like an open question in 
the end, as if to say stay tuned for more. These stories show very well how CCS can be viewed 
from numerous different angles without getting any closer to a conclusion to the debate.  
Based on this material, we can look into who the players are in the CCS field and what their 
stance is. The players that support CCS are the UN (and IPCC), the EU, USA, Australia, Norway, 
Germany, the UK, Canada, United Arab Emirates, Greenpeace UK and Bellona. Bellona, 
according to one article (not from this category though), gets funding from the Norwegian 
government and companies. The ones that support CCS with certain conditions are energy 
company Shell, which says it will only be available in large-scale in 2050 (due to their own 
investment strategies), and China, which says they have nothing against CCS, if they get 
funding from industrial countries. 
The MIT University criticizes CCS for being slow. Google has chosen massive investments in 
renewable energy. India finds the technology too expensive and of developing countries also 
Brazil has chosen to go against proposals of including CCS in CDM saying they are concerned of 
possible leakage. Greenpeace International along with other environmental NGOs think 
development of CCS is away from real solutions such as energy efficiency and investing in 
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renewable. In addition, lock-in in fossil fuels is seen as a problem. The Finnish energy company 
Fortum decided to abandon CCS in Finland, because of strategic reasons. They prefer focusing 
on hydro- and nuclear power. Meanwhile, the Finnish Government decided not to support 
CCS, but wood energy and wind power.  
Based on this material, the disputes between developing countries will probably be about who 
can afford CCS and who gets support from wealthier nations. At least India and China are 
already differing in their opinions. Also energy companies seem to have differences in opinion 
in what is good business. Some of them think renewable energy is the best option and others 
vote for CCS. There is disagreement also among NGOs, since Bellona is supporting CCS and also 
a part of Greenpeace is doing so. It seems to be a matter of whether they see CCS as 
unavoidable or not. Most environmental NGOs oppose the technology. 
Next (Figure 15.-18.) I present how the stories bounce from positive (green) to negative (red) 
and sometimes even to completely different themes (blue). 
HS14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. 
 
HS17. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. 
 
The problem is that 
the technology has 
not yet been tested in 
large power plants 
and it will only 
become viable in 
2050. 
The emissions of 
the infamous 
coal power 
plants can be 
calculated close 
to zero. 
Some see the 
technology as 
a threat. 
Against the 
current swims 
Bellona, that sees 
CCS as inevitable. 
The 
organization 
receives 
private and 
government 
Who are we to say 
that this huge 
proportion of the 
population should be 
taken away the 
chance to use coal? 
But isn’t the 
price of CCS a 
problem? 
Even Bellona 
is concerned 
about the 
slow process 
of CCS 
technology. 
The 
recommendation 
by scholars has 
given speed.  
In the climate 
negotiations, 
many countries 
would like CCS to 
be included in 
CDM. 
All developing 
countries are 
not equally 
enthusiastic. 
In the EU the 
technology is 
seen 
positively. 
Environme
ntal NGOs 
have been 
critical. 
Bellona 
would also 
want 
burning of 
biomass. 
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Figure 17. 
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Figure 18. 
 
 
  
The Australian 
ZeroGen trial is 
like a tiny soot 
particle 
compared to 
the serious 
puffing. 
But you 
have to 
start 
somewhere. 
CCS is already 
in the 
government 
platforms of 
the UK and 
Germany. 
A research by the 
MIT University 
proves that CCS is 
progressing 
troublesomely. 
The energy 
company Shell 
believes that 
CCS will be in 
broad use only 
after 2050. 
Nature has 
given warnings 
for this project 
too [Lake Nyos]. 
The one who gets a 
head start in 
renewables, may get 
the lead position in the 
21st century energy 
race. Surprisingly, 
Google has signed on. 
It’s a dead end to 
put CCS in CDM 
[Scientist Abjorn 
Torvanger]. 
Minister of Environment 
and International 
Development points out 
that in some cases easier 
to clean emissions from 
industry. 
Several large 
developing 
countries have 
gone against 
the proposals. 
Norwegian 
authorities 
believe CCS can 
be crucial. 
Also the IEA and 
the UN believe 
the technology 
will be 
important. 
If the 2-degree 
target be taken 
seriously, CO? 
emissions will be cut 
before then [before 
CCS becomes 
viable]. If the 
starting point is less 
ambitious, CCS has a 
larger role 
[Torvanger] 
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The articles mainly list different players and their opinions on CCS without taking a stand on 
the issue. In this sense, the uncertainty seems to be, that everything is uncertain. These 
articles could belong to risk class Pythia, in which there is great ambiguity connected to a risk 
whose probability of occurrence and extent of damage are un-known. What should be done is 
left for each individual to decide. For risk class Pythia, precautionary measures are 
recommended for reducing the risks. 
Like the other stories, these too represent some typical phenomena of the media portraying 
risks related to new technologies. Contradicting different sources of information is done to 
create tension and conflict, which is more interesting for the reader (Jönsson, 2011). Risk 
amplification may also take place due to the strong presence of dispute (Kaspersson et al., 
2000).  
Interestingly, the majority of these articles are from the Finnish media, which could be 
connected to the fact that the general opinion about CCS has not yet been very clearly formed.  
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The aim of this research was to give an overview of the media’s portrayal of CCS related risks 
based on Finnish and Norwegian newspaper articles. I described five different groups of 
articles according to the framings of CCS technology. The level of uncertainty elevated 
significantly from group one towards group five. It is possible to say that there is great 
variation on how the media portrays the risks; whether they are simple, complex, uncertain or 
ambiguous. In other words, the type and degree of uncertainties themselves are uncertain. 
This suggests that the handling of risks is rather complicated, since it is difficult to decide what 
measures to prioritize in order to reduce the risks. 
The key issues in the articles are divided in whether risks towards or caused by CCS are 
discussed. The risks towards successful CCS seem to be mainly connected to funding, which 
connects to emissions’ prices, the climate agreement and viability of investments. The possible 
failure of funding then again connects to the launching of the technology becoming too slow. 
The slowness connects to the fact that for climate change mitigation, the technology needs to 
be ready before the emissions are already cut significantly. If the technology misses that point, 
it will not be taken on anymore. In other words, if we succeed to efficiently reach the climate 
targets, CCS will not be relevant. If we fail, then it will be an important addition to mitigation 
measures. As has been shown before (Markusson et al., 2012), this chain of effects is very 
complex, with one thing affecting another involving causal relationships that are hard to 
estimate and significant uncertainties. 
The risks caused by CCS are mainly the lock-in in fossil fuels, it’s possible negative effect on 
developing renewable energy and environmental and health risks in general. The acceptability 
of CCS as a means of mitigating climate change depends in great deal on whether these risks 
are taken as severe or not. Science is lagging behind in estimating the risks, so the decisions 
cannot be based on science-based facts only. CCS definitely represents the kind of situation 
where it is hard to tell whether courage or caution is in order (Klinke and Renn, 1999). There is 
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a clear danger of risk amplification in public perception, meaning that citizens may oppose 
strongly to the technology if decision making and information spreading are not dealt with 
efficiently. 
As said in the introduction, this research is not meant to be a comparative case study. 
However, I will look briefly into the most interesting differences between Norwegian and 
Finnish writings at this point. As could be expected, there is quite a clear difference due to the 
situation in which each country is in terms of CCS development. Norway is very active and 
pushing CCS forward. Consequently, the articles are generally not very critical of the 
technology itself. Instead they mostly talk about the risks that threat successful CCS. What is a 
bit surprising in the Norwegian media coverage, is the strong contradictions between hype and 
problems. The media ends up transmitting the stress of getting the technology through and in 
addition, the big difficulties in succeeding. The question is, whether the readers perceive the 
flip side of the hype.  
 In Finnish articles risks caused by CCS are brought up more. Generally, the Finnish articles 
bring out more aspects on the issue, both positive and negative, leaving quite an ambiguous 
image to the reader. Regardless of all the critique and ambiguousness, several Finnish articles 
imply that CCS will be relevant in the future. There is careful doubt in the air- over what CCS 
means to the world and what Finland’s position is in it. The matter seems to be quite open to 
any future directions. The reader might be left either with rather negative feelings, from some 
of the critical articles that mention danger related to the technology, or they might be left with 
no clear perception at all. 
As one goal of this research, I wanted to look into the possible implications of my findings. 
There were four of Klinke and Renn’s (1999) risk classes present in the articles: Cyclops, 
Medusa, Pandora and Pythia. This means all three of the listed risk management strategies are 
needed: science-based, precautionary and discursive. The policy implications by Klinke and 
Renn do not seem to make a very effective point, since the uncertainties of CCS involve almost 
all of the risk classes and consequently most risk management strategies are more or less 
relevant.  
To give a more concrete idea of CCS risk dynamic, I applied my findings to the figure of risk 
dynamic by Klinke and Renn (1999) (Figure 4.) modifying it slightly to better fit the case of CCS 
(Figure19.). The events or measures that lead to the risks moving either to the intolerable or 
the acceptable area are pointed out. The movement of the risk to the normal area means it 
becomes calculable with traditional risk analysis methods, not that the risk goes away 
completely.  
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 = Normal area  =Intermediate area  =Intolerable area = Substitution 
Figure 19. Risk dynamic of CCS; risks towards the success of the technology on the left and 
risks caused by the technology on the right. 
 
In the risks towards the success of CCS technology the starting point is Pandora, because the 
risks involve irreversible consequences and they could be persistent. The specific risks found in 
the studied articles are the timing in launching the technology to mitigate climate change and 
failures in funding. If the right timing is missed, the technology will fail. The right timing is 
something that can hardly be calculated because of very complex causal relationships (see i.e. 
3.1.). This would imply referring to precautionary measures and searching for substitutes.  
The failures in funding can be irreversible, but they might not be persistent. Also, it is possible 
to expand the knowledge related to funding, for example if the adequate legal framework is 
put in place and funding becomes more certain. Then, the risks could move to a lower risk 
class, Pythia.  Risk class Pythia is in the context of this research seen as a representative of 
ambiguousness. The specific risks found in the articles of this risk class are lock-in and leakage, 
which lead to two value-related questions: is the technology worth the risk of leakage and do 
people want fossil fuels or renewable energy? If political and public support concentrates on 
renewable energy, the technology could fail. If fossil fuels continue to get political support and 
CCS is accepted as a sufficient means of cleaning up the emissions, the technology could move 
to the normal area. 
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In risk class Cyclops, only funding and public acceptance are seen as problems. The extent of 
damage is known with each, but probability of occurrence is not. This leads back to 
ascertaining funding to move the risks to the normal area. If funding cannot be assured, the 
risk might move to the intolerable area in the form of projects failing because of the lack of 
funding or public acceptance. Public acceptance is closely tied to risk class Medusa, which is a 
risk class in which high mobilization effects create significant consequences. This is seen as a 
risk in the normal area in Klinke and Renn’s version of risk dynamics. In the case of CCS public 
opposition may present a serious threat to the technology, as history has already proven (i.e. 
the case of Barendrecht, see 2.3.4.). To move this risk to the normal area, effective discursive 
strategies are needed.  
When it comes to the risks due to CCS technology, the dynamic would be slightly different. 
Failing to prevent climate change is a very irreversible and persistent matter. So the risk would 
move to the intolerable area, the worst case scenario being catastrophic climate change. If this 
is seen likely, substitution should be considered. Another option is that it moves to Cassandra 
since it could be quite a while until the inefficiency of a mitigations means is noticed and 
therefore the risk could be perceived as non-severe. In risk class Cassandra, issues like long-
term responsibility, substitution and containment are relevant for reducing the risks. 
To move CCS from Pandora to Pythia, again knowledge needs to be expanded. This could 
perhaps be possible in the case of leakage, which was one of the risks mentioned in the 
articles. Others were lock-in and viability, of which neither can be helped by expanding 
knowledge. If a lock-in in fossil fuels is seen as unacceptable (in politics and among the public) 
the risk would move to the intolerable area. This would also mean taking resources from the 
development of renewable energy. If fossil fuels are still seen as inevitable or as a key element 
for economic growth, it can move to the normal area. In risk class Cyclops leakage is seen as 
the main problem caused by the technology, leading to the spoiling of ground waters and 
severe health effect to humans. The spoiling of ground waters could lead back to risk class 
Cassandra, since there could be a delay before the consequences are noticed. However, if the 
probability of occurrence and extent of damage of both are known and acceptable, the risks 
can move to the normal area. 
Klinke and Renn (1999) stress the importance of including the public in determining the 
objectives of risk evaluation and weighing the criteria for evaluating different options. Also in 
the CCS risk dynamic figure (Figure 19.), you can observe the presence of public perception in 
many of the turning points. When talking about the media, this relates to Kaspersson’s (2000) 
theory on risk amplification. As an agenda-setter, the media can have a decisive role in either 
enhancing or decreasing public acceptability. It could end up amplifying the risks of CCS while 
trying to make the stories interesting for readers by adding dramatization and dispute (see 
3.2.). In the don’t believe the hype stories, these are very dominant characteristics. Pandora is 
the largest group of articles of the whole analysis and in that sense important. On the other 
hand, the hype might leave the uncertainties unnoticed and the consequent perception could 
end up being positive after all. 
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In the studied data, a great deal of simplification (see 3.2.) is also present. The simple solutions 
stories group included almost as many articles as the largest group. In contrast, in these 
articles the risks are at least seemingly very simple. This could reduce public perception of 
risks. This phenomenon is also known as popularization, which makes it easier for readers to 
understand complex scientific or technological issues. It is said in many of the articles that if 
we just get this one more step forward, the technology will move, as if certainty could be 
found in the future. This is another typical characteristic of the media’s risk portrayal (Jönsson, 
2011). 
In this research, the media can be seen as a representation of public perception. Klinke and 
Renn (1999) talk about integrating values in decision making, but stress the importance of 
seeing through the biases related to them. This is very crucial when looking at media. One can 
observe multiple methods that journalists use to raise people’s interest. In connection to this, 
we can observe two extremes: on one hand, the exaggeration and on the other, the 
diminishment of risks. What this tells us is that the perception could easily be either or. This is 
not very helpful for finding adequate risk management strategies, but what can be of use is 
knowing the turning points where public perception is relevant and in which it could shift to 
either direction –positive or negative. According to our findings these turning points are:  
 
What kind of energy production is supported?  
Is CCS an acceptable mitigation means?  
Is the risk of leakage taken as severe?  
 
In these matters, extra attention should be put into looking at the biases on both sides 
(courage-carefulness or exaggeration-diminishment) openly, but making sure the decision 
makers stay in the middle and don’t refer to the extremes. This means not basing 
decisions too much on values - which could lead to the exaggeration of risks - but also not 
relying too much on knowledge -which could be too limited and end up simplifying the 
risks too much (Klinke and Renn, 1999). These findings underline the importance of 
integrating the stakeholders of CCS in a deliberative decision making process, especially 
when dealing with the issues identified as turning points connected to public perception.   
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Appendices 
Appendice1. List of data. 
Article Date Group 
HS1 8.11.2010 don’t believe the hype 
HS2 10.3.2010 don’t believe the hype 
HS6 10.5.2008 critical voices 
HS8 15.4.2011 critical voices 
HS9 12.11.2010 simple solutions 
HS13 22.3.2010 deterministic stories 
HS14 10.3.2010 tossing the ball around 
HS15 24.2.2010 simple solutions 
HS16 1.6.2009 simple solutions 
HS17 1.6.2009 tossing the ball around 
HS18 4.1.2009 simple solutions 
HS19 22.4.2008 tossing the ball around 
HS20 22.4.2008 don’t believe the hype 
HS22 8.1.2007 deterministic stories 
AP2 21.11.2009 tossing the ball around 
AP3 5.3.2008 don’t believe the hype 
AP4 3.5.2010 don’t believe the hype 
AP5 4.9.2008 simple solutions 
AP6 15.3.2010 simple solutions 
AP8 29.10.2007 don’t believe the hype 
AP9 29.1.2009 simple solutions 
AP10 27.5.2008 don’t believe the hype 
AP11 3.3.2010 simple solutions 
AP13 3.3.2010 don’t believe the hype 
AP15 18.4.2008 deterministic stories 
AP16 07.12.2011 deterministic stories 
AP20 02.7.2011 don’t believe the hype 
AP21 17.2.2010 critical voices 
AP22 31.1.2010 deterministic stories 
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Appendice2. The storyline sketches of the articles in the same order as in the list of data. 
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